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1 The Project
Can we know the world? The Cartesian intuition is that this is problematical, to put it
mildly. We might be deceived as to every aspect of the external world, even as to its very
existence. But luckily we do know our own minds and we know we ourselves exist.
At least that much is certain. Isn’t that what Descartes’ cogito is all about?
In his Die Unerkennbarkeit des Geistes. Phänomenale Erfahrung und menschliche
Erkenntnis, Steen Olaf Welding, philosophy professor at the Technical University of
Braunschweig, tries to show that the Cartesian tradition has it all backwards: we do not and
cannot know the mind, neither our own nor that of others, at all. Knowledge of the external
world, however, is no problem. Of course we cannot be absolutely certain of anything, but
justified knowledge of reality is perfectly possible.
More in particular the author wants to argue that naturalistic epistemologies are doomed
to fail because they neglect fundamental epistemological problems. Moreover, the failure
to acknowledge these problems undermines the whole project of a naturalistic theory of
mind. The unknowability of the mind must be assumed, not only in all cognitive science,
but in the very phenomenal experience of one’s own existence and in our (human)
knowledge of reality.
The main tool Welding uses to upset the Cartesian applecart and to topple the project of
naturalistic epistemology is conceptual analysis. Defining knowledge as something that can
be justified, and distinguishing between mental states and mental facts, he tries to clarify
the nature of both knowledge and phenomenal experience. The book stands clearly in the
tradition of Wittgensteinian analytical philosophy.
Reading the book is hard work: the author does not make any concessions to the reader,
and the book certainly does not wear its structure on its sleeve. It is not easy to reconstruct
the argument from the rambling meditations and digressions on the densely printed pages.
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2 Knowledge, Doubt and Certainty
Starting with Descartes’ methodical doubt, Welding first analyses the nature of doubt itself.
‘‘The distinction between the assertion of a doubt and of a possible doubt is such that on the
one hand I have a reason for the assumption that p could be false, and that on the other
hand I could have a reason for the assumption that p could be false’’.1 When no such
ground could exist, doubt is impossible. Doubt is not the same as uncertainty: whereas
doubt implies the ground to assume that something could be false, uncertainty simply
assumes that something might be false, without any concrete grounds for this assumption.
Descartes’ method of systematic doubt ends in a logical contradiction, when he tries to
doubt something that is in fact indubitable: his own existence. Thus Descartes’ dualism of
substances is based on a dualism of knowledge: on the one hand there is the indubitable
knowledge of one’s own mind, on the other hand the dubitable knowledge of the material
world.
But then Welding rejects this dualism of knowledge. In his analysis, the assertion of
knowledge implies the capacity to justify one’s assertion, to give grounds for it. Though of
course these grounds need justification in their turn, this regress does not mean that a
knowledge claim can never be sufficiently justified. A knowledge claim is sufficiently
justified when we have no concrete grounds to doubt its justification. The mere fact that
something could be doubted does not mean in itself that it is doubtful.
Now what about an assertion that is indubitable—no grounds for doubt could be pos-
sible? In that case it does not make sense to ask for a justification. But if it does not make
sense to ask for a justification, there can be no question of knowledge. One may be certain
of some bit of knowledge, but that in itself does not preclude the possibility of justification.
However, when one is immediately certain of something, the very immediacy means that
there are no grounds for it. And when there are no grounds, there can be no justification so
there is no knowledge, precisely because knowledge is defined as essentially involving
justification. Therefore it is impossible to speak of knowledge of one’s own mental states:
one is immediately certain of one’s mental states, one simply has them. There is no
possibility of justification, and therefore no knowledge. One can direct one’s attention to
one’s own mental states, but one cannot find out whether one has them or not. True, one
may be uncertain whether one is, for instance, really in pain. But this is a case of immediate
uncertainty; no further investigation is possible.
The consequence of this conception of the impossibility to know one’s own mental
states is that the Nagelian reflection on what it is like to have mental states (Nagel 1974)
cannot be about knowledge. Therefore also Jackson’s knowledge-argument (Jackson 1982,
1986) is off key. There simply is no knowledge involved here. When someone says ‘‘I
know what it is like to see colours’’ she simply means that she has had phenomenal colour
experiences. Just as it is impossible to know that one is in a certain mental state, it is
impossible to know what it is like to be in such a state.
Mental states are immediately certain, yet nothing can with certainty be inferred from
them. Although knowledge of conscious or mental states is impossible, one can have
knowledge about mental facts. Mental facts are just that: facts. One can find out about
them, one can be mistaken in them etc. My fear is a mental state; I have it, but I have no
knowledge of it. Perhaps my fear is a case of ailurophobia: it may be that it is cats that I am
1 ‘‘Der Unterschied zwischen der Behauptung eines Zweifels und eines möglichen Zweifels besteht darin,
dass ich zum einen einen Grund für die Annahme habe, p könnte falsch sein, und zum anderen, dass ich
einen Grund für die Annahme haben könnte, p sei falsch’’ (pp. 26–27).
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afraid of. This ailurophobia is a mental fact: I can find out about it, experiment about it and
I can also be mistaken about it: it may turn out that it was not cats that I am afraid of, but
closed spaces. Yet the fear itself is a mental state, and no knowledge of it is possible, nor
can any mental fact be inferred from it with certainty.
In a perceptual context, the distinction between mental states and mental facts boils
down to the distinction between sense impressions and sense perceptions. A perception is a
fact; an impression is a mental state. The distinction between sense impressions and
perceptions is independent from the distinction between appearance and reality. Appear-
ances are not the same as sense impressions; they are certain visual properties that the
object simply may or may not have. We can find out which visual properties the object
really has. But we cannot find out anything about our sense impressions.
We can cognitively elucidate our mental states and find out with which mental facts
they correspond. This is, however, not a causal explanation of our mental state, but a
psychological explanation. We can also give psychological explanations of the mental
states of others; in that case we simply assume from the beginning that they do have mental
states. We cannot doubt this, as we have no concrete grounds for doubt. But neither can we
justify this conviction that others have mental states. We are inescapably committed to the
existence of other minds. We are certain of this, though we have no right to be certain. As
we have neither grounds to doubt that others have mental states, nor grounds to justify the
conviction that they do have them, we cannot have knowledge of the mental states of
others, just as we have no knowledge of our own.
Our own mental states are immediately certain, but not cognitively certain. A percep-
tion, on the other hand, has a cognitive indication. That is to say, it is based on grounds,
however certain or uncertain, and so we have some cognitive attitude towards it. In the
elucidation of mental states by mental facts we express a cognitive indication. We can have
different cognitive attitudes to the ascriptions of mental facts to ourselves and others.
3 Cognitive Science and Naturalistic Epistemology
Having reached this point in his analysis, Welding goes on to criticise cognitive science.
According to him we cannot ascribe mental facts to computers, as they do not have any
cognitive attitude towards their own mental facts. Turing’s imitation game is better named
a simulation game. The computer does not have any intention to imitate. It would be
absurd to try and find out whether the computer knows or doubts or hopes that something is
green. It has no cognitive attitudes; it can only simulate them. We can know or doubt or
hope something is green on the basis of a computer outcome; we are the ones who interpret
the computer’s outcome.
But neither can we ascribe mental states to the brain. Physical events in the brain are not
mental states; we cannot explain what mental states are by describing brain events. There
may be psychophysical connections, but we cannot explain them scientifically. Physical
events are observable, but mental states are not. Nor can they be described as any event.
They cannot be identical to physical events.
And just as we cannot claim that a mental state is identical to a physical event in the
brain, we cannot claim that a mental state is the result of some physical event. Again: we
cannot observe this mental state and we cannot have knowledge of it. It is dubious to try
and find nomological relations between the observable and the unobservable. We may




Neuroscientists do not differentiate between mental states and their coming into being:
they only explain the coming into being, but claim to have explained the mental states
themselves. They have to learn to accept the fact that mental states are unobservable and
inexplicable. They can only explain how, when or why mental states come into being, but
they cannot explain what it is that has come into being. We can observe empirical objects
only when we presuppose our own subject, and that is only possible when the subject is not
an element in the class of empirical objects.
Naturalistic epistemology (in the tradition of Quine 1969) seeks to base observation
statements by a causal theory of sensory receptors. The same sensory stimulus leads in
different people to the same observation statement, according to this program. The stim-
ulus is sufficient for the truth of the statement. In the end we can substitute ascriptions of
brain events for ascriptions of mental states. But the interpretation of a brain event as a
mental state cannot be verified. Moreover, it is the person that has mental states, not the
brain. We can only mentalistically interpret brain events and states, when we have the
assent of the person.
Things get even more problematical when the neurobiological thesis is considered that
the objects of perception are constructs of the brain. For when we then look at our own
brain, insurmountable difficulties arise. It is impossible that we see our own perception,
that we catch our own perception red handed, so to speak, in an autocerebroscope. For that
which we perceive must exist independently and temporally prior to the act of perceiving
it. We are forever too late. What we see is a brain event, an empirical object, but our own
act of perceiving that object is unobservable. Our perceptual state, our sense impression, is
already presupposed in our perception of the brain.
In the end our own mental states are presupposed in all our knowledge. There is no
duality of knowing: immediate knowledge of our own mental states and mediate knowl-
edge of the world. We do not know our mental states; but we are immediately certain of
them. They form the presupposition for all that we do know. This difference between
immediate certainty and knowledge is more fundamental than the presumed difference
between the mental and the physical. When the mental is unknowable, there is no mind–
body problem left. For the realist this changes little: all we can know is the material world.
But without perceptions we could not arrive at empirical knowledge. The realists have it
backwards: they try to explain phenomenal experience by empirical knowledge. Our
knowledge of reality is dependent on our perceptual capacities. And our observations
themselves, with their concomitant sensory impressions and cognitive attitudes are con-
sciousness-dependent. We have no glassy brain: we cannot observe our own observations
as objective happenings in our brains. We have no knowledge of our mental states. But we
do have knowledge of reality.
Our knowledge, however, is limited: it is dependent on our perceptual capacities. Both
materialism and idealism are therefore out of the question, and so is the assumption of the
existence of mind and matter. It makes no sense to ask whether anything of a mental nature
exists, because we cannot describe the mental by its properties. Though our phenomenal
experience is presupposed in all our knowledge, we have no knowledge of this experience
itself. The mind is unknowable.
4 Evaluation
Welding’s work is very analytical: it is like an axiomatic system. From the axiom that there
is only one kind of knowledge and that it implies the capacity to give grounds, the whole
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structure follows. Welding claims that the assumption of the unknowability of the mind
forms the basis of all our knowledge. But this assumption itself is based on an a priori
definition of what knowledge is. So it is this definition that bears the burden of the whole
argument.
In itself the argumentation is correct and at times ingenious, though the somewhat
rambling style makes rather high demands on the reader. Given the initial definition of
knowledge, the claims about the unknowability of the mind and the impossibility of any
naturalistic study of it follow inexorably. But one wonders what grounds this definition
itself. To be sure, it definitely has its merits. It bears the clear stamp of Wittgensteinian
philosophy and it certainly solves problems. Or rather, it dissolves them. There is no
duality of knowledge, there is no mind-body problem, there is not even any metaphysical
problem of dualism or monism. It almost seems as if there is no metaphysics at all, only
epistemology. Such Wittgensteinian therapeutics liberates us from a whole plethora of
philosophical problems.
But at the same time this therapeutic philosophy has a very reactionary impact. The
whole enterprise of naturalistic epistemology is deemed to be totally misguided, and so is
most of cognitive science. The definition of what knowledge is fixes what we can know. It
is simply no use to study the mind, as it is ruled out of the court of the knowable by
definition. We know in advance that we cannot know it.
But should we thus cower for the power of concepts? And do we want to be liberated
from philosophical problems in this way? The philosopher Thomas Nagel puts it like this:
‘‘The history of [philosophy] is a continual discovery of problems that baffle existing
concepts ... At every point it faces us with the question of how far beyond the relative
safety of our present language we can afford to go without risking complete loss of
touch with reality. ... Historicist interpretation doesn’t make philosophical problems
go away, any more than the earlier diagnoses of the logical positivists or the lin-
guistic analysts did. To the extent that such no-nonsense theories have an effect, they
merely threaten to impoverish the intellectual landscape for a while by inhibiting the
serious expression of certain questions. In the name of liberation, these movements
have offered us intellectual repression’’ (Nagel 1986, 11).
Likewise the naturalistically inclined scientist will not be impressed. She thinks it always
unwise to try and stem the tide of science with too stern and static methodological pro-
hibitions. Welding says that ‘‘On methodological grounds it must appear dubious to link
observable statements with unobservable statements with a nomological hypothesis’’.2
Apart from the fact that this is unclear—surely it is not the statements themselves that are
observable or unobservable—this seems unnecessarily restricting. Of course there are all
kinds of difficulties about the ontological status of the unobservable. But is science not
precisely in the business of trying to find hypotheses linking the observable with the
unobservable? What else is physics about? If there is anything we can learn from the
history and philosophy of science, it is that whenever a philosopher claims that some kind
of investigation is impossible, there is a scientist who is already doing just that.
Wittgenstein, for instance, claimed to know we could never get to the moon:
‘‘... there might be people who believe that [it] is possible [to get to the moon] ... they
are wrong and we know it’’ (Wittgenstein 1969, 286).
2 ‘‘Aus wissenschaftsmethodologischen Gründen muss es fragwürdig erscheinen, beobachtbare Aussagen
mit nichtbeobachtbaren Aussagen durch eine nomologische Hypothese zu verbinden‘‘ (p. 164).
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The most poignant example of such a fruitless resistance to the advance of science must be
Mach’s phenomenalistic opposition to atomism (Mach 1897). We have abandoned a
Machian attitude to natural science—why should we keep it on towards a science of the
mental? According to Welding all knowledge of phenomenal experience is impossible, but
there already exists scientific data on experience. Take, for example, Koenderink’s
investigations of the experience of pictorial depth (Koenderink et al. 1995, 1996). The
investigations clearly deal with sense impressions, not with the perception of something
real, according to Welding’s own definitions. There is no real depth in a picture; the picture
is two-dimensional. Neither is it the judgement of depth that is measured. The research
investigates the individual differences in the subjective experience of depth, by ingeniously
making the subjects reproduce the amount of depth they experience. It turns out that there
are startlingly large differences in the amount of depth experienced by different subjects in
the very same picture. One would say that this was new knowledge about the mental states
of people, about their phenomenal experience. It would be interesting to know what
Welding would make of these investigations.
But we do not know this, as Welding makes no mention of this kind of investigation. In
fact the whole work is also rather conservative in another sense. The author condemns
naturalistic epistemology and cognitive science, but he addresses himself almost exclu-
sively to analytic philosophers. Much of the literature he discusses stems from the 1970s
and 1980s. The arguments of naturalistic philosophers and cognitive scientists themselves
are not dealt with in any detail. Quine, surely the main target of the whole argument, gets a
meagre six pages, and no major cognitive scientist is to be found in the index (or the book)
at all.
It is undeniable that the whole domain of the sciences of the mental is rife with
conceptual confusions, and disciplined conceptual analyses of the problems involved are
badly needed. But concepts are not immutably fixed for all eternity. When they forbid us to
formulate certain intuitively felt problems, or to pursue certain inquiries, their liberating
force becomes oppressive. Both philosophers and scientists of mind want to get on. Often
they are too impatient with conceptual analyses. But though they certainly are in need of
the discipline of conceptual clarification, they will not and should not be stymied by an
analysis that tries to rule their whole enterprise out of court.
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